Introduction
The situation arising from the invasion and occupation of Kuwait by Iraqi troops a decade ago provides international scholars with a test case which may be studied from many different angles, human rights protection and monitoring being one of them. Human rights were, and still are, under pressure in many ways as a result of the Gulf conflict and its aftermath. This article will only try to address two of these: human rights and sanctions against Iraq and human rights and the use of force. These topics have been deliberately selected because they offer, in this author's opinion, the most challenging questions within two of the core issues of our discipline: the limits of sanctions adopted by the UN Security Council and the legal boundaries of the unilateral use of force.
In another recent and provocative symposium, a discussion of unilateralism in international law gave Professors William Michael Reisman and Pierre-Marie Dupuy in particular the opportunity to warn us keenly about a 'deregulation' process, occurring either as a tendency in adjudication and coercion 1 or as a result of economic globalization.
2 Could deregulation also be a by-product of the last 'decade of sanctions', particularly with respect to decisions on the protection and monitoring of human rights? The existence of this deregulation process will be used in this article ex hypothesi and is broadly defined, for our purposes, as the deliberate and gradual disappearance of the rule of law, blurred by the persistent conduct of particular interested states 'without aspiring to create a viable new rule', 3 and its substitution with the rule of power which allows, for each particular case, the creation of a new scenario governed by case-by-case authoritative decisions. 4 The following pages will be devoted to a quest for evidence of deregulation in these two areas. As the wide panoply of sanctions adopted against Iraq and the legality of unilateral use of force for 'humanitarian purposes' have already been adequately described and dealt with by prestigious scholars, they will be revisited here only where necessary. These precedents, however, must be regarded with caution: in the Spanish case, measures were not adopted by the Council but by the General Assembly in its Resolution 39 (I). In the Congo affair, the intervention of the Council and the Secretary-General was highly criticized by the Soviet Union and other states, and SC Res. 161 (1961) was adopted with the abstention of France and the USSR. In the Rhodesian affair, human rights violations were closely connected with the violation by the white minority of the right to self-determination. Finally, in the case of South Africa, the apartheid regime was accompanied by South African aggression towards its neighbouring states and by illicit arms trade in the area. 7 Only SC Ress. 808 (1993) and 827 (1993) on the the establishment of a criminal tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, and SC Res. 955 (1994) on the criminal tribunal for Rwanda, determined clearly the violations of international humanitarian law as a threat to peace. thus frame a new set of rules applicable to future institutional reactions to analogous situations.
But the Council's practice over the last decade does not offer a coherent and unified system of institutional sanctions in the case of violations of basic human rights. In order to discover whether this was a deliberate practice on the part of the Security Council -and its prominent members -or not, leads us to an inquiry into its reasoning. The motivation of sanctions, their scope and their management might offer a valuable inroad into the Council's corridors of reasoning.
A Motivation of Sanctions
Chapter VII of the UN Charter, conjugated with Articles 25 and 103, offers the Council 'the highest possible legislative dignity known to contemporary man'. 5 Once it has been decided that a situation may threaten the peace under Article 39, the Security Council may decide to adopt measures as laid down in Articles 41 and 42.
But the problem arises when, in exploring its practice, we discover that the Council's determination only obliquely includes the violation of human rights as a cause of the threat to peace. Curiously, it was during the Cold War that this kind of 'human rights determination' was decided by the Council: in the case of the dictatorship in Spain, the violence in the Congo, the racist illegitimate government in Rhodesia or the apartheid regime in South Africa, it was the violation of fundamental human rights and the dignity of persons that mainly attracted the attention of the Council. 6 But from 1990 onwards, violations of human rights have only been mentioned in relation to other causes of threats to peace, 7 such as the deterioration of the situation in a particular state as in the case of Liberia or Somalia, 8 A close analysis of the voting in the Council and the reasons then given, 19 the early recall of the provisions of Article 2(7) of the Charter in the second considerando of the Resolution's preamble, the absence of express reference to Chapter VII and the tasks assigned to Iraq, the UN Secretary-General, humanitarian organizations and states, force us to hesitate, in Peter Malanczuk's words, as to the precedent value of this resolution with regard to a more active role of the Security Council under Chapter VII in cases of gross violation of human rights threatening international peace [which] should not be overestimated, although it will certainly serve as an important reference in the future for other cases.
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B The Scope and Limits of Sanctions
The Council decided to impose an embargo upon Iraq and the occupied territory of Kuwait and a blockade to implement it. The decision on the lifting of sanctions remains in the hands of the Council under paragraph 24 of Resolution 687 (1991) and a committee was created by paragraph 6 of Resolution 661 (1990) to manage the sanctions.
Humanitarian reasons were first included to alleviate the severity of sanctions in paragraph 2(c) of Resolution 661 and this was later confirmed in paragraph 1 of Resolution 666 (1990) and paragraph 20 of Resolution 687 (1991). At the beginning of the conflict, however, the humanitarian consideration was absent from decisionmaking, notwithstanding the efforts of some states within the sanctions committee.
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Information in New York as to what was happening in the Gulf area was either lacking or distorted: the fact that the Iraqi regime did not accept fact-finding missions and propaganda did not allow for an accurate assessment of the humanitarian situation in Iraq, and this was exacerbated during the conflict. Rather, allied states' policies against Iraq did not emphasize the neutral evaluation of sanctions and their impact upon the population. 22 However, submission of the Ahtissaari Report on the humanitarian situation in Iraq and Kuwait of March 1991 23 influenced the subsequent adoption of new measures upon Iraq. Since then, only humanitarian circumstances have softened the sanctions imposed. Even though this humanitarian criterion for sanctions has been more thoroughly analysed in other contributions to this Symposium, three questions may be briefly addressed here:
• First, does this humanitarian standard apply in the subsequent sanctions
The humanitarian 'rule', 'exception' or 'standard' could be simply defined -following a recent use by the Security Council -as 'the necessity for sanctions to contain adequate and effective exemptions to avoid adverse humanitarian consequences on the people . . ., and that they be structured in a way that will not impede, thwart or delay the work of international humanitarian assistance organizations or governmental relief agencies providing humanitarian assistance to the civilian population . . .'. SC Res. adopted by the Council, and thus can we infer the existence of a 'humanitarian rule' applicable to sanctions in current international law? 24 It is possible to discern the 'humanitarian rule' in general embargoes on commodities and products other than the military decided by the Council, 25 normally having a scope similar to that in the other two cases involving comprehensive economic sanctions: against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) (FRY hereinafter) 26 and Haiti. 27 In most cases, this kind of comprehensive embargo seems to be explicitly avoided for humanitarian reasons (as happened particularly in the cases of Angola/UNITA, 28 Sudan, 29 Sierra Leone, 30 and Afghanistan/Taliban 31 ), and instead other kinds of measures foreseen in Article 41 of the UN Charter are applied. The latter shows a typical tendency in recent practice of Security Council sanctions imposed in fulfilment of the 'humanitarian rule': to adopt targeted or smart sanctions. 32 As expressed by the UN SecretaryGeneral, 'the concept of "smart sanctions" which seek to pressure regimes rather than peoples and thus reduce humanitarian costs, has been gaining support among Member States'.
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• Second, once the 'humanitarian rule' is accepted, the limits of sanctions must also be examined. Two main limits -legal and political -might be applied. The legal limit makes international humanitarian law fully applicable to institutional sanctions. The Security Council cannot, and must not, forget its constituent legal basis, the UN Charter, and its political character does not release it from its observance. 34 The Charter (Preamble and Articles 1 and 55, particularly) refers to international law. 35 Appeals to the Council that any sanctions regime must take international human rights instruments and humanitarian standards fully into account have come from different sources. 36 Moreover, its five permanent members have also put this interrelation on record, 37 as done recently by the Second Panel established by the Council itself concerning the humanitarian situation in Iraq. 38 The political limit was underlined by the UN Secretary-General in the so-called 'Millennium Report', when Mr Annan warned that '[w]hen robust and comprehensive economic sanctions are directed against authoritarian regimes, a different problem is encountered. Then it is usually the people who suffer, not the political elites whose behaviour triggered the sanctions in the first place. Indeed, those in power, perversely, often benefit from such sanctions by their ability to control and profit from black market activity, and by exploiting them as a pretext for eliminating domestic sources of political opposition.' 39 The less democratic (or even less structured) a targeted regime (state) is, the more 'collateral damage' sanctions will do to the civil population.
• Finally, the effectiveness of the 'humanitarian rule' depends upon the gathering of accurate information, either sur pièce or sur place. Early observance is needed to assess the impact of sanctions on the humanitarian situation. As we have seen above, the gathering of information in Iraq was hindered for several reasons; but the problem worsens politically when information does exist and is not accurately used or assessed. The case of Haiti is symptomatic: the Secretary-General informed the UN in general, 40 and the Security Council in particular, 41 on the humanitarian situation in Haiti; economic sanctions were nevertheless imposed and maintained. In other cases, dual-use commodities which could be labelled either as humanitarian foodstuffs (oil, helicopters, pharmaceuticals, etc.), have been excluded from the humanitarian exception due to the absence of a 42 See some examples for the Yugoslav conflict in Scharf and Dorosin, supra note 25, at 781 et seq. The involvement of regional agencies in recent practice and the new uses of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter is another by-product of the last decade of the maintenance of international peace and security. See Cardona-Llorens, 'La coopération entre les Nations Unies et les accords et organismes régionaux pour le règlement pacifique des affaires relatives au maintien de la paix et de la sécurité internationales', in B. Boutros-Ghali amicorum discipolorumque liber: paix, developpement, democratie (1998) 251; and Gray, 'Regional Arrangements and the United Nations Collective Security System', in H. Fox (ed.), The Changing Constitution of the United Nations (1997) 91. 45 Between the two main committees (Iraq and Yugoslavia), the latter has barely used the former rulings. See Scharf and Dorosin, supra note 25, at 789. Even more so, as in the case of the Yugoslavia Committee, when citing its own previous rulings, it 'explicitly assert[ed] that they are not to be taken as precedent for future cases' (ibid, at 824).
monitoring system as to their final use. 42 A new involvement of the Council in the close monitoring of situations that may endanger international peace and security seems to have been currently adopted. 43 In addition to the gathering of information usually done by the peacekeeping operations (PKO) when deployed in the conflict area, a new trend deduced from recent practice shows how regional and sub-regional agencies and organizations must be in close connection with the sanctions committees not only in the gathering of information but in its legal and political assessment as well.
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C The Management of Sanctions
Once sanctions against a targeted state have been decided, the Security Council establishes a sanctions committee under Article 28 of its provisional rules of procedure. Here a first possibility for a deregulative tendency might be advanced: Why not have the same sanctions committee for all situations? It is true that all the committees are composed of the same states -the members of the Security Council. But personnel from each state are often different in each committee (and even in each meeting), upsetting the uniform interpretation of the sanctions regimes as required by a normally uniform wording of sanctions in the Council's resolutions. Although the Council has attributed to the sanctions committees a quasi-judicial function in interpreting each sanction regime, each committee has performed that function with neither clear instructions from the Council nor an authorization to use the precedent of other committees as authoritative decisions. 45 As underlined by Michael P. Scharf and Joshua L. Dorosin, [f] or reasons of fairness and predictability, identical provisions in different regimes should be construed as identical in scope . . . [but] [t]here is no mechanism, however, to ensure this consistency under the existing regime. It logically follows that questions arising under one sanctions regime should not be addressed solely in terms of the precedent of that regime. Rather, recourse should be made to the precedent of the other regimes and each case should be viewed as a potential precedent for such other regimes including as yet unforeseen regimes that may be instituted in the future, using the provisions of the current Security Council resolutions This is somewhat familiar to other subsidiary organs of the Council, such as the UNCC. See Aznar-Gómez, 'Environmental Damages and the 1991 Gulf War: Some Yardsticks before the UNCC', 14 LJIL (2001) 301. It is also surprising that there is not a provision for seeking legal advice from the UN Legal Counsel. See Conlon, supra note 5, at 651-652. 48 Since 1995, however, the Council's members have made an effort to make the procedures of the sanctions committees more transparent and routine decisions may receive expeditious treatment; but, as a general rule, the Council has decided that the '[m]eetings of the Sanctions Committees should remain closed, as they are now, and the summary records of those meetings should continue to be distributed according to the existing pattern' (UN Doc. S/1995/234). as models. There is no mechanism, however, to ensure this consistency under the existing system. 46 Each committee has had to construct its rulings within a limited legal framework and apply a case-by-case approach, coming from and going to a deliberate creative ambiguity. 47 Yet, possible deregulation could either be found in the absence of explanation of the legal basis of their rulings or in the secrecy of their work. 48 For a sensitive issue such as sanctions, the following observation of Karel Wellens may be perfectly applied: a special obligation to act as transparently as possible is incumbent upon non-plenary organs acting on behalf of the whole membership under the governing provisions of an Organization's constituent instrument. The more extensive powers are bestowed upon a non-plenary organ, the more compelling the impositions of such special obligation from the perspective of effective accountability. 49 It is true, however, that from 1999 onwards serious efforts have been made to enhance the work of the sanctions committees. In its note of 29 January 1999, 50 the President of the Security Council declared the agreement of all members of the Council on some proposals, particularly those directed towards improving the gathering and assessment of information, the monitoring of the envisaged situations with comprehensive and technified procedures, including a clarification, harmonization and continued evaluation of the mandatory measures and guidelines on sanctions, and increasing the transparency of the sanctions committees. This is particularly applied to the 'humanitarian exception', which should deserve periodic meetings of the committees to analyse the impact of sanctions on the humanitarian situation.
These peculiarities in the functioning of sanctions committees are relevant to our analysis of the application of the 'humanitarian rule'. 51 Scharf and Dorosin, supra note 25, at 783. Depending on the case, a liberal and ample interpretation of the humanitarian exception has been adopted by committees, including not only basic foodstuffs and medical items but other more controversial items (such as cigarettes or matches). Free information items (such as newspapers, journals, etc.) have also been included and special care has been given to the 'religious exception' (as a human right exception), which particularly included the pilgrimage to Muslim holy places as an exception to air embargoes in Iraq, Libya and Sudan. management of sanctions directly affect the proper functioning of that rule, particularly the gathering and assessment of information, the definition of humanitarian items and the final application of the 'humanitarian rule':
• Information arrives at the sanctions committees almost exclusively from states and the Secretary-General: this is the basic wording of its constituent rule. 52 But, as Martti Koskenniemi has remarked with respect to the Iraq Committee, 'le comité 661 n'a jamais étudié en détail les divers rapports nationaux, mais en a simplement pris acte.' 53 Therefore, the primary source of information has been the notifications from states on intended shipments of humanitarian foodstuffs and supplies. 54 As a means of control, notification on humanitarian exceptions might have adopted (but did not) the model of notification for the arms control regime imposed upon Iraq, with the participation of the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) and the IAEA.
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• As a matter of predictability, attempts to formulate a guiding list of exempted humanitarian items, as in the case of Iraq, did not succeed in the case of Yugoslavia. On the contrary, 'the Committee stated that it preferred to "consider specific questions" concerning proposed humanitarian exports to the FRY "on a case basis, as they arise".' 56 But in all cases, consensus governs the decision-making process in committees; and with respect to the no-objection procedure, any objection could delay the arrival of humanitarian items for as long as discussions continue within the sanction committee.
• Finally, as already stated, ongoing verification of the fulfilment of the entire 'humanitarian rule' (gathering of information, assessment and application) has 57 See neither been properly entrusted to the committee, nor given appropriate mechanisms to comply with.
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The 'humanitarian rule' normally applies and functions on an ad hoc basis within each sanctions committee. Avoiding precedent, the sanctions committees have used a case-by-case decision-making process with a limited (if they exist) canvas of reference rules. However, consistency, predictability and fairness -in short: the rule of lawapplied to the work of sanctions committees seem to be necessary if a legitimate system of institutional sanctions is to be maintained.
Human Rights and the Use of Force
As a result of a process initiated before the Second World War, but accelerated by and projected from the 'UN human rights regime', the end of the 1980s witnessed the confirmation of a new set of rules of public intervention 58 in the quest for human rights protection. These rules cannot -and must not -be assimilated into old patterns of 'humanitarian intervention', which were 'elaborated in a specific context, i.e. in the notable absence of both human rights law and an all-out prohibition of the use of force.' 59 The protection of human rights seems to be a collective (and selective) will determined by the Security Council, but the enforcement of that protection by means of the use of force returns to old patterns of unilateralism, leaving the Security Council aside. Both of these aspects contain evidence of deregulation.
A Determination of the Collective Will
In the last two decades, the renewed 'humanitarian action' has adopted a step-by-step approach, which may or may not be headed by the Council. Depending on whether or not the humanitarian situation can be categorized as a 'threat to the peace' under Article 39 of the Charter, action may be governed by either the rules of humanitarian assistance 60 or by the particular law-making of the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter. But this law-making begins with that prior determination under Article 39 of the Charter. Here we find the first deregulation in the entire process due to the fact that, as expressed by Jean Combacau in a deliberate truism, 'une menace pour la paix au sens de l'article 39 est une situation dont l'organe compétent pour déclencher une action des sanctions déclare qu'elle menace efectivement la paix.' 61 Determination under Article 39 is thus a caveat which bestows upon the Security Council a power of appreciation not easily subject to control. 62 Actually, the framers of the Charter wanted to avoid specific control over this determination. 63 The practice of this UN organ has also shown that the Council has found 'threats to peace' in such different kinds of situations that it cannot be said that there is a clear, precise and well-defined concept of 'threat to peace'. It is true that several 'humanitarian situations' have been invoked by the Council, either directly or indirectly, as a 'threat to the peace'; but it is also true that a broad interpretation of human security has been adopted by the Council -at least theoretically -as a term of reference. 64 Such a broad assessment of what can be understood as 'threat to peace' allows the Council to approach each particular case with differing levels of formal 65 and material 'intensity', 66 leaving room for an ad hoc approach in each particular case. Issues of double standards, different involvement depending on the case, and secrecy in prior consultations before action (or inaction) in the Security Council 67 threatens the legitimacy of the UN executive organ, undermining its authority in public opinion.
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B Enforcement, with or without the Security Council
Since 1990 the Council, with a more or less clear humanitarian scope, has authorized the use of force in the former Yugoslavia, Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, the Great Lakes Region in Africa, Albania, the Central African Republic, Guinea-Bissau and East Timor. The cases of Iraq, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Kosovo, however, warrant a different legal approach.
Leaving aside the discussion on the general lawfulness of these authorizations or delegations, 69 what is true is that this new practice is not so clearly submitted to control within the Council -its checks and balances 70 -as the never-used powers pursuant to Articles 42 et seq. of the Charter would be. The decision process within the Security Council, including the negotiations and consensus among its members (and particularly the 'big five') and the participation of the military staff foreseen in Articles 46 and 47 of the Charter, at least offers the necessary checks and balances when deciding where, when, how and by whom the force must be used (and stopped). One attempt at a solution has been to give a large degree of command and control over the operation to the Secretary-General -a role not foreseen in the Charter -and to impose upon the latter (and the states concerned) a more or less clear obligation to report to the Council on a regular basis on the implementation of the mandates. 71 But these command and control powers have been continuously debated in the Council and the lack of effective control has caused concerns or abstentions in the voting for draft resolutions. 72 Even when these command and control powers have been explicitly retained by the Council, the vagueness of the mandate -often worded as 'all the necessary means' -incorporates another caveat in the resolutions giving the concerned state(s) or regional arrangement(s) an ample, not limited, spectrum of possible uses of force. 73 This problem has usually arisen when acting through a PKO as well, leaving room for misunderstandings as to the operation's mandate. 74 And exploring the different mandates and tasks assigned to PKOs created since 1990, one cannot find a common pattern of human rights involvement in each and every operation. 75 Cases of the use of force in humanitarian situations show a glissement not foreseen in the Charter that gives to the state(s) or authorized arrangement(s) a power originally only recognized with respect to the Security Council. 76 The exception to the general rule set down in Article 2(4) is becoming the current rule, with a 'privatization' of the exercise of the power 77 when 'the algebraic rule of the lowest common denominator' 78 is achieved among the members of the Council. And the deregulative process could be found in the fact that there is no coherent or unified framework for that exception. Although in the case of Rwanda an express reference was made to the Somalia precedent in order to provide a 'legal framework' for the intervention, 79 in the end each case has been constructed depending on particular or common interests of the member states of the Council (and particularly the permanent members). For the facts, see the detailed articles by Malanczuk, supra note 20, and Alston, supra note 15.
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'Curiously', no particular ongoing human rights monitoring mechanisms were either proposed or foreseen by the powers acting institutionally or unilaterally, as was the case with disarmament issues which were deemed to deserve the creation of several ad hoc Council subsidiary organs. Hence, human rights protection seems to have been more of a rhetorical ground for action than a real motive for action, before, during and after the conflict.
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Attacks have included not only air combat among fighters and strikes against Iraq's SAM batteries, but also severe cruise missile attacks against Iraq's military capabilities. led by a single state 80 which creates its military staff committee, again far removed from Chapter VII and, particularly, its Articles 46 and 47.
In the Iraqi case, command and control of the different uses of force authorized (to implement the blockade or the withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait) were certainly not in the hands of the Council or, at least, the Secretary-General; and this was even worse when the use of force was for alleged humanitarian reasons. After the determination of the consequences of the repression of the Iraqi civilian population as a threat to peace in Resolution 688 (1991), the Council never, expressly or implicitly, authorized any state to deal with the situation using force. As Christine Gray has said, although referred to at the time by the States involved, [ Though the use of force has been claimed by the UK and the US to be authorized by different Security Council resolutions, both no-fly zones in Iraq were imposed and are maintained unilaterally without any Council authorization, 85 in contrast to the model adopted for the no-fly zone over Bosnia which was decided for a similar purpose. 86 The alleged protection of the Kurds and Shiite populations was thus the first case of the use of force for humanitarian purposes without the Council.
The second case was in Sierra Leone, with the involvement of a regional agency: the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and its 'Monitoring Group' (ECOMOG).
87 By Resolution 1132 (1997), the Council authorized ECOWAS to monitor the embargo on oil and weapons against Sierra Leone. The regional arrangement used ECOMOG to implement that embargo. However, from February 1998 onwards, ECOMOG troops arrived in Sierra Leone to monitor and implementusing force when necessary -the peace agreement signed on 23 October 1997, 88 but not authorized by the Council under Article 53(1) of the Charter.
As in the precedent of Liberia, ECOWAS acted more in line with the old 'humanitarian intervention' model instead of a current peace-keeping operation. 89 But, what is more remarkable is that it did so without the prior consent of the Security Council, as Resolution 1132 (1997) cannot be a legal basis for the kind of force used by ECOMOG in Sierra Leone. Later on, in its Resolution 1162 (1998), the Council seems to have assumed, from this resolution onwards, responsibility for the action as it authorized the coercive measures with respect to Sierra Leone as it did with respect to Liberia. 90 Closing the cycle of the decade, the use of force against Yugoslavia in the Kosovo case demonstrates use of force by a regional agency (NATO) but, again, without prior Council authorization, 91 the possible ex post facto authorization by Resolution 1244 (1999), 10 June 1999, being the subject of critiques 92 and discussion. 93 Nevertheless, though several states, particularly Russia, Namibia, India and China, 94 highly criticized the military intervention and the circumvention of the Security Council's role, perhaps the most interesting issues concerning this unilateral action as a possible deregulation precedent were the ideas implied in the new 'Alliance's Strategic Concept', approved in the April 1999 NATO Washington Summit, while bombing in Yugoslavia still continued. Paragraph 31 of the 'Concept' offers NATO to support on a case-by-case basis in accordance with its own procedures, peacekeeping and other operations under the authority of the UN Security Council or the responsibility of the OSCE, including by making available Alliance resources and expertise. In this context NATO recalls its subsequent decisions with respect to crisis response operations in the Balkans. 95 The development of NATO's tasks has come not only from the 'out of zone' operations 96 but also from the 'out of treaty' operations. 97 A case-by-case approach following the Balkans model is thus admitted, but, as the 'Concept' says, under the authority of the UN Security Council or of the OSCE. Professor Simma's tour d'horizon of the rule prohibiting the threat or use of force and its exceptions 98 describes the state of current law. Professor Cassese for his part proposes that unlawful NATO intervention in Kosovo may gradually lead to the crystallization of a general rule of international law authorizing armed countermeasures for the exclusive purpose of putting an end to large-scale atrocities amounting to crimes against humanity and constituting a threat to the peace. 99 Is customary process thus in motion? 100 The second of Professor Cassese's EJIL articles is also illuminating for our purposes when addressing opinio necessitatis as distinct from opinio iuris. Even accepting that 'the opinio necessitatis was strong and widespread', this might lead to a deregulative process if non-authorized interventions 'constitute a fallback solution for cases where inaction would be utterly contrary to any principle of humanity.' 101 Is this a 'fallback solution' in any case, depending on whether or not a 'coalition of the able and willing' exists? Or is limited by a minimum legal framework?
As Security Council practice has shown during the last decade, the legal panorama on the use of force to protect and monitor human rights is subject to many and varied circumstances (the target of the humanitarian intervention, the intervening actors, the mandates, etc.). The interaction of all of these variables impedes, in the present author's view, the establishment of a pattern of clear, homogeneous legal criteria on the authorization of the use of force in humanitarian situations. Oscar Schachter, towards the beginning of the 'authorization decade', stated that [e] ven in the absence of such prior approval, a State or group of States using force to put an end to atrocities when the necessity is evident and the humanitarian intention is clear is likely to have its action pardoned. But, I believe it is highly undesirable to have a new rule allowing humanitarian intervention, for that could provide a pretext for abusive intervention. It would be better to acquiesce in a violation that is considered necessary and desirable in the particular 106 It is true, however, that exceptional situations need exceptional solutions. Public humanitarian (hard) intervention might therefore be restricted to those cases where human rights are flagrantly, massively and gravely violated. For other cases, 'mild' but firm intervention might be preferred, thus preserving hard interventions as ultima ratio.
General and its envoys, etc.), is paramount in order to provide updated information on measures affecting human rights. A closer relationship between the Security Council and UN human rights bodies must also be developed, with the former taking full account of expert advice from the latter. Once information has been accurately gathered and assessed, the concept of 'smart' or 'targeted' sanctions acquires all its virtues, becoming attractive even to reluctant states. The policy of 'avoiding the precedent' is another factor which could lead to some kind of deregulation: both within the different sanctions committees and within the Security Council itself when deciding coercive measures, states are reluctant to bind themselves to previous decisions so that they may remain free for future action.
106 Ad hoc solutions have been normally preferred, thus translating into legal action the political will of states and their particular policies within a highly politized organ: the Security Council. 'Ad-hocism' therefore appears as a deregulative tool in the sense that, avoiding the precedent, it cannot permit a clear set of rules on current humanitarian intervention (soft and hard) to be elucidated by the UN and/or its Member States.
This may have a somewhat schizophrenic impact on the current international law of institutional protection of human rights since states' conduct -the material component of custom -differs dramatically from their opinio juris, thus impeding clarification of the legal framework of public humanitarian intervention (soft and hard). It also might have an impact on the legal construction of a public intervention of the international community with a proper public order, with normative and institutional primary and secondary rules in defence of human rights as a shared basis of the foundation of that community.
